Harmonic sequence paradox by Blavatskyy, Pavlo R
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2006
Harmonic sequence paradox
Blavatskyy, Pavlo R
Abstract: Informal evidence suggests that individuals are willing to pay only a finite and, typically,
very low price for a specific lottery that converges to an infinite payment with probability one. The
established decision theories (expected value, expected utility theory, cumulative prospect theory) cannot
satisfactorily explain this low willingness to pay. The presented paradox strengthens the original and the
super St. Petersburg paradox.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0606-9
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-2235
Journal Article
Published Version
Originally published at:
Blavatskyy, Pavlo R (2006). Harmonic sequence paradox. Economic Theory, 28(1):221-226.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0606-9
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0606-9
Economic Theory 28, 221–226 (2006)
Harmonic sequence paradox
Pavlo R. Blavatskyy
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich,
Winterthurerstrasse 30, 8006 Zurich, SWITZERLAND
(e-mail: pavlo.blavatskyy@iew.unizh.ch)
Received: Spetember 27, 2004; revised version: January 15, 2005
Summary. Informal evidence suggests that individuals are willing to pay only a
ﬁnite and, typically, very low price for a speciﬁc lottery that converges to an inﬁnite
payment with probability one. The established decision theories (expected value,
expected utility theory, cumulative prospect theory) cannot satisfactorily explain
this low willingness to pay. The presented paradox strengthens the original and the
super St. Petersburg paradox.
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Consider an urn that initially contains one white and one black ball. An individual
draws one ball from this urn and receives one dollar (nothing) should the ball be
white (black). Whatever the drawn ball happens to be, it is subsequently put back
into the urn. Additionally, one more black ball is added to the urn. The individual
then draws one ball again and the cycle continues ad inﬁnitum. At each iteration,
the drawn white ball pays off one dollar and the number of black balls is increased
by one. What is a maximum price that a rational individual is willing to pay for
participation in this lottery L?
Informal evidence suggests that an individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) for
lottery L is ﬁnite and, typically, very low (less than ten dollars). This ﬁnding is
paradoxical because it cannot be easily accommodated within established decision
 I am grateful to PeterWakker, whose suggestions helped to simplify signiﬁcantly the exposition of
the main idea, and to the participants of a brown-bag seminar at CERGE-EI (June 23, 2004, Prague),
notably Dirk Engelmann andAndreas Ortmann, who suggested interesting testable explanations for the
paradox.
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Figure 1.The true lottery distribution and its approximation by the binominal distribution. The points of
a discrete distribution are connected by a smoothed continuous line to facilitate the distinction between
different distributions
theories, as demonstrated below. Let pn(x) denote the probability of winning x ∈
[0, n] dollars after n draws of a ball. Equation (1) deﬁnes the lottery distribution
pn : [0, n] → [0, 1] recursively. For large n, the lottery distribution pn has mean
µn = 1/2+1/3+ ...+1/n ∼= lnn− 1+C1,1 where C1 = 0.5772... is the Euler-
Mascheroni constant, and variance σ2n ∼= lnn − C2, where C2 = 1.0676... is a
constant. For large n, the lottery distribution pn can be accurately approximated by
the binomial distribution Bm (q) that has the same mean (mq = µn) and variance
(mq(1 − q) = σ2n), as demonstrated by Figure 1.
pn (0) = 1/(n + 1)
pn (n) = 1/(n + 1)! (1)
pn (x) = pn−1 (x) · n/(n + 1) + pn−1 (x − 1) ·1/(n + 1), x ∈ [1, n − 1]
Clearly, the concept of expected value (EV) is not a descriptive decision theory
for lottery L because it predicts an inﬁnitely large WTP for L (limn→∞µn = ∞).
This conclusion restates the implication of the original St. Petersburg paradox (e.g.
Bernoulli, 1738).
Proposition 1. For any ﬁnite monetary value x, the probability that lottery L
delivers x or less is zero (∀x ∈ N ∪ {0} : limn→∞
∑x
y=0 pn (y) = 0).
Proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix.
1 Sequence 1/2, 1/3, ..., 1/n is called the harmonic sequence, which explains the name of the
paradox
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Proposition 1 effectively states that an outcome of lottery L converges to an
inﬁnite payment with certainty. In other words, the reduced form of the compound
representation of L (in the ﬁrst paragraph) is an inﬁnite payment with probability
one.
Expected utility theory, or EUT, (e.g. von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944)
with unbounded utility function (e.g. u(x) = lnx, u(x) = √x) cannot explain a
ﬁniteWTP forL.The concept of unboundedEUT is not a descriptive decision theory
for lottery L because it predicts an inﬁnitely large WTP for L (u−1(EUT (L)) =
u−1(u(∞) · 1) = ∞). This conclusion restates the implication of the so-called
super St. Petersburg paradox (e.g. Menger, 1934).
EUTwith a bounded utility function can explain a ﬁniteWTP forL only if there
exists a ﬁnite wealth level M beyond which the marginal utility of any additional
income is zero (∃M ∈ N : ∀x ≥ M,u(x) = u(M)). This is a stronger restriction
than the one imposed by the super St. Petersburg paradox, which requires a utility
function just to be bounded (∃W ∈ R : ∀x ∈ N, u(x) ≤ W ). An individual’s
WTP for L then is u−1(EUT (L)) = u−1(u(∞) · 1) = u−1(u(M)) = M . When
an observed WTP for L is of a magnitude of ten dollars, according to the bounded
EUT, an individual’smarginal utility of any income above ten dollars should be zero.
Such implication clearly contradicts common sense and the existing experimental
evidence (e.g. Wakker and Deneffe, 1996). Thus, the EUT with a bounded utility
function can explain a ﬁnite WTP for L but it cannot satisfactorily explain a low
WTP forL. The same conclusion holds for rank-dependent utility theories (allowing
for a continuous non-linear probability weighting function) and themost prominent
of them – the cumulative prospect theory, or CPT, (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman,
1992).
Apparently, none of the established decision theories (EV, EUT, CPT) can satis-
factorily explain the harmonic sequence paradox. Figure 2 illustrates this theoretical
conclusion. For different (large) numbers of iterations, an individual’s WTP for L
is calculated as predicted by EV, EUT and CPT. The true lottery distribution pn is
approximated by the binomial distribution.All theories predict thatWTP is increas-
ing by approximately 2 dollars with a tenfold increase in the number of iterations.
EV (a solid line) predicts the highest WTP. The prediction of EUT (dashed lines)
with unbounded utility functions u(x) =
√
x, u(x) = x0.88 is approximately 50
cents below the prediction of EV. The prediction of CPT (dotted lines) is almost
identical for four different parameterizations that were elicited by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Abdellaoui (2000), and Bleichrodt
and Pinto (2000). CPT predicts the lowest WTP for L, which is approximately 2
dollars below the prediction of EV.
Conclusion
The presented paradox employs a speciﬁc lottery L converging to an inﬁnite pay-
ment with certainty. This fact notwithstanding, informal evidence suggests that
individuals are willing to pay only a ﬁnite and low price for L. The established
decision theories (EV, EUT, CPT) cannot satisfactorily explain this low WTP. The
presented paradox is stronger evidence against expected value (unbounded EUT)
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Figure 2.An individual willingness to pay (in dollars) for the lottery employed in the harmonic sequence
paradox (as a function of a number of iterations) calculated through: a) the expected value (EV); b)
the expected utility theory (EUT), with individual utiltity function u(x) = √x, u(x) = x0,88; c)
the cumulative prospect theory (CPT), with parameters as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Wu and
Gonzalez (1996), Abdellaoui (2000), and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000)
than the original (super) St. Petersburg paradox. The St. Petersburg paradoxes em-
ploy a lottery with exponentially growing outcomes that can quickly exceed the
ﬁnite wealth of the planet (e.g. Samuelson, 1977, p. 27). The presented paradox
employs lottery L whose explicit outcome is just one dollar per iteration. Thus, an
individual is psychologically more averse to L compared to a lottery with explic-
itly mentioned large outcomes (as in the St. Petersburg paradoxes). The implicit
outcomes of lottery L grow logarithmically with the number of iterations.
The proposed paradox may be refuted on practical grounds. Since it employs
a lottery with logarithmically growing mean, about 1043 iterations are required to
guarantee at least a modest expected outcome of 100 dollars. This problem is not so
apparent in the St. Petersburg paradoxes where the probability of inﬁnitely many
iterations is inﬁnitely small. However, an individual may be informed that L is
simulated on a computer with high processing speed for a ﬁnite (large) number of
iterations (e.g. 1015) within a short period of time (e.g. 5 minutes). Any observed
discrepancy between actual WTP (e.g. <$10) and the theoretical prediction (e.g.
>$30 as demonstrated by Fig. 2) is then as damaging to the established decision
theories as the inﬁnite version of the paradox itself. Such discrepancy also rules
out the explanation of a low WTP because an individual either anticipates only a
ﬁnite (low) number of iterations or may become bored after many iterations. By
eliciting an individual’s evaluation of the sumof the harmonic sequence
∑∞
i=2 1/i it
is possible to test yet another explanation of a lowWTP forL due to an individual’s
failure to realize that this sum is diverging. Finally, this theoretical note can be
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complemented with the experimental elicitation of an individual’sWTP for a ﬁnite
L when there are several white balls in the urn initially (or the number of white
balls, or the monetary payoff on a white ball, increases slightly with the number of
iterations). Such experimental results may identify the conditions under which the
discrepancy between actual and predicted WTP decreases.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 1. For any ﬁnite monetary value x, the probability that lottery L delivers
outcome x is zero (∀x ∈ N ∪ {0} : limn→∞pn (x) = 0).
Proof by contradiction. Suppose that ∃x ∈ N ∪ {0} : limn→∞pn(x) = 0.
Using formula (1), pn(x + 1) = nn+1pn−1(x + 1) + 1n+1pn−1(x) =
n
n+1 (
n−1
n pn−2(x + 1) +
1
npn−2(x)) +
1
n+1pn−1(x) = ... =
1
n+1 (px(x) + ... + pn−2(x) + pn−1(x)). Since limn→∞pn(x) = 0⇒ ∃ε >
0 : ∀n ≥ x, pn(x) ≥ ε. Then, pn(x + 1) ≥ n−xn+1 ε ⇒ limn→∞pn(x + 1) ≥ ε.
Similarly, it is possible to prove that ∀k ∈ limn→∞pn(x + k) ≥ ε. Then,
limn→∞
∑n
y=0 pn(y) ≥ limn→∞
∑n
y=x pn(y) ≥ limn→∞(n − x + 1)ε = ∞.
However, this contradicts the assumption that pn is a probability distribution i.e.
limn→∞
∑n
y=0 pn(y) = 1
Proposition 1 is proved by mathematical induction.
a) When x = 0, Proposition 1 holds trivially: limn→∞
∑x
y=0 pn(y) =
limn→∞pn(0) = limn→∞ 1n+1 = 0.
b) Suppose that Proposition 1 holds for ∀x < X .
c) Let us prove that Proposition 1 then also holds for x = X .
limn→∞
∑X
y=0 pn(y) = limn→∞pn(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 due to Lemma 1
+ limn→∞
∑X−1
y=0 pn(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 due to assumption b)
= 0.
Proposition 1 then holds for any ﬁnite x by mathematical induction.
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